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Netanyahu Finally Found a President Willing to Buy Into His Iran Dream
New Republic 6 days ago

Netanyahu Finally Found a President Willing to Buy Into His Iran Dream

On September 12, 2002, Benjamin Netanyahu—then out of government and power—was invited to the U.S. House of Representatives to provide “an Israeli perspective” on a possible U.S. invasion of Iraq. With his usual hubris and swagger, Netanyahu made a confident prediction: “If you take out Saddam, Saddam’s regime, I guarantee you that it will have enormous positive reverberations on the region.… I think that people sitting right next door in Iran, young people, and many others, will say the time of such regimes, of such despots, is gone.”In March 2015, Netanyahu contrived an invitation from the then speaker, Republican John Boehner, to address a joint session of Congress behind President Barack Obama’s back, something unheard of in the annals of the U.S.-Israel relationship. Netanyahu, then prime minister, vehemently attacked the Iran Nuclear Deal, or JCPOA, after years of trying to convince the United States how critical it was to reach such a framework. It will never work, he claimed. In May 2018, he pressed President Trump to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement, explaining to him with conviction that if only the U.S. reimposes “crippling sanctions” on Iran, the Islamic Republic would beg for a new, improved deal. On all three assessments, Netanyahu was tragically and comprehensively wrong. That somehow did not diminish either his credibility with most American officials or his campaign against Iran. By June 2025, he persuaded Trump to join an Israeli attack and together “obliterate” (as Trump later boasted) Iran’s military nuclear program. As for Iran’s ballistic missile development and production, Netanyahu flaunted that after Israel’s military achievements, a historic change had taken place. Eight months later, there is neither obliteration nor historic change. Which leads to the three-part question: Who started the current war, why, and what is the strategic objective? Is it “regime change”? That would be a desirable outcome, but surely Netanyahu, a self-declared ardent student of history, knows that “regime change” has never been induced through aerial or missile power, with the unique and singular exception of Japan in 1945, but that was accompanied by a credible threat of invasion and, more importantly, two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If the objective was to defuse the nuclear threat supposedly posed by Iran, as Trump argued just before he argued something else, why hasn’t the U.S. attacked North Korea, which does in fact have both nuclear weapons and missiles that can reach the continental U.S.?If the idea is to exploit Iran’s geopolitical and military weakness since 2024–2025 and further isolate it, both are legitimate goals, but wasn’t that supposedly achieved in June 2025? So why risk being accused of dragging the U.S. into a war in which it has no vested interests or benefits? Answer: because that’s what Netanyahu does. Political critics and detractors will point to Netanyahu’s tedious fixation with Iran posing an imminent existential threat as a manifestation of his authoritarian, populist, and even quasi-fascist political character and persona. Authoritarians need an enemy; they need to stir existential anxiety in the public and unite it against that enemy; they habitually evoke existential threats; they demagogically fan fears and incite hysteria; they require and create a constant warlike atmosphere. For decades, Netanyahu grimly exuded “This is 1938 all over again” with respect to Iran, positioning and grooming himself as the Israeli Winston Churchill facing the Hitlers in Tehran, and playing on Israelis’ collective trauma of the Holocaust. His attitude was spurious, often manipulatively alarmist, and politically expedient, but it was not without foundations. Iran has been widely regarded as a dangerous nemesis threatening to “erase Israel.” The combination of an extremist and vociferously vile theocracy with nuclear weapons was a lethal geopolitical cocktail justifiably perceived as an existential threat not just by Netanyahu but by many in Israel’s defense, political, and diplomatic circles.This idée fixe about Iran has deeper roots in Netanyahu’s interpretation of the cycles and trajectory of Jewish history. This is a concept he seemed to have borrowed from his father, historian Ben Zion Netanyahu, who in his magnum opus on the Spanish Inquisition inferred adverse cyclical trends to Jewish civilization. Every few hundred years, a power rises and threatens to annihilate the Jewish people, either ideologically and theologically or physically. It begins with the Hellenistic period in the fourth century BCE, then under Roman rule, finally culminating in the rebellion of 66 C.E. and the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E.; the 200-year-long Crusader “Kingdom of Jerusalem” (1099–1291); the Spanish Inquisition (1478 to roughly the 1830s); rampant antisemitism, persecution, and pogroms in the nineteenth century, leading to fascism and shortly thereafter German Nazism, the systematic racial and ethnic extermination of Jews. By the late twentieth century, a new existential threat emerged, both Netanyahu senior and his son Benjamin concluded: Islamofascism, centered in Tehran and intent on destroying Israel. Iran became the defining feature of Netanyahu’s political life, despite Israel’s strength, military and technological superiority; its relations with the U.S.; and, most vexing and ominous, its unresolved conflict with the Palestinians. Iran was the be-all and end-all of Netanyahu’s political identity, career, and self-image. Furthermore, his histrionic depiction of Iran as a threat to the entirety of Western civilization led him to develop delusions of grandeur that he is in fact not only the Lord Protector of Israel but the Savior of the West. All he needed to do was convince a succession of American presidents that this is history’s inexorable trajectory and they had better heed his advice and policy recommendations, meaning engage Iran militarily. Enter the political rationale, and the dog-wagging aspects of the war. That President Trump was deflecting away from the toxic effects of Epstein files chaos, the Supreme Court decision on the illegality of his tariffs policy, his abysmal standing in the polls, and his swelling unpopularity on both the economy and immigration has been written about extensively in the days since the war began. That he lacks the constitutional basis to declare war when America was not attacked, that he contradicts himself and fumbles and jumbles with justifications for the war, is being dissected by American pundits and analysts. His statements have been bizarre even by his own erratic and incoherent standards. Iran was developing missiles that could reach the U.S.? There is zero evidence of that, other than Netanyahu telling him that. Iran was planning an attack on the U.S., therefore the war is preemptive, as Secretary of State Rubio said? That’s a spurious claim at best, and American intelligence sources dispute it. That he was surprised Iran didn’t capitulate to his demands during negotiations? That warrants a new edition of The Art of the Deal. That he expects the Iranian military and Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps to lay down their weapons? Really? Like the Vietcong did in Vietnam? The Taliban in Afghanistan? The Houthis in Yemen? ISIS in Iraq? Where on earth did he get this nonsense from?Unless he was prodded relentlessly and vigorously by Netanyahu, which he surely was. But while Trump’s rationale for an unprovoked war with Iran is unclear or inexplicable, with Netanyahu it is very simple: This is what he’s wanted for years, and in Trump he found the perfect accomplice. Trump is a narcissist eminently amenable to sycophancy, malleable when excessively praised, and susceptible to the “No president has done this before you” argument.Notwithstanding his historical compulsion with Iran, Netanyahu also has a major “wag the dog” compulsion. He is on an ongoing trial for corruption, bribery, and obstruction of justice. He is facing an election in 2026 with an upset, dejected, and restive electorate. More importantly, from Netanyahu’s perspective, the narrative has to change. The man responsible for the worst catastrophe and calamity in Israel’s history, October 7, 2023, the man who marketed himself as “Mr. Security” and a world expert on combating terrorism, was at the helm and accountable for the worst debacle since Israel was established. The only way to redeem himself was to turn that calamity into a region-altering strategic triumph. For that he crucially needed the U.S. But if he was wrong on Iraq, wrong on the original Iran nuclear deal, wrong on urging Trump to withdraw from it, wrong on his Gaza policy—relying on Hamas to avoid negotiations with the Palestinian Authority—and profoundly wrong on the Palestinian issue writ large, is it possible that he is right here? Whatever he whispered to Trump, the template is more likely Iraq 2003 than Venezuela 2026.

How Congress Set the Stage for Trump’s Illegal War in Iran
New Republic 6 days ago

How Congress Set the Stage for Trump’s Illegal War in Iran

President Donald Trump’s military campaign against Iran is an illegal and unconstitutional war. Congress did not authorize military action against Iran. The joint U.S.-Israeli airstrikes that killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country’s supreme leader, and wiped out a significant portion of the country’s political leadership and military infrastructure, were not proportionate strikes to deter an aggressor, nor were they acts of immediate self-defense.Trump’s allies have tried to paper over this simple explanation with unpersuasive complexity. Iran, we have been told by CBS News and The New York Times, has been at war with the United States for almost 50 years since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. This is obviously not true in any meaningful sense. If it were, as The Atlantic’s Adam Serwer observed the other day, then a good portion of the Reagan administration committed treason during the Iran-Contra scandal by clandestinely selling arms to Tehran.Nor do the administration’s actual defenses make sense. Some Trump officials have studiously tried to avoid calling it a war, apparently worried about the reaction it would cause among Americans. (Trump himself has shown no such reticence, and he does not appear to care whether the war is lawful or constitutional in the first place.) Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters earlier this week that the U.S. had been drawn into the war by an Israeli attack.“It was abundantly clear that if Iran came under attack by anyone … they were going to respond and respond against the United States,” he explained on Monday. “We knew there was going to be an Israeli action. We knew that would precipitate an attack against American forces. And we knew that if we didn’t preemptively go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties.”This explanation does not suffice, either. The United States is both a superpower and the single largest supplier of military and economic aid to Israel. It can crush a smaller country’s economy without violence in the blink of an eye. The Trump administration has no shortage of means to coerce or deter Israel from attacking another country in a way that would endanger American lives. Trump and his subordinates, in Rubio’s version of events, apparently chose not to use them.Just because Congress’s prerogatives were violated by the military campaign, however, does not mean it was blameless in this matter. Congress has chosen for many years to maintain large, perpetual standing armies that can deploy overwhelming firepower to any corner of the globe in a matter of hours. In doing so, it has upended the constitutional checks that determine when and how presidents can wage war.For most of American history, this country did not maintain true standing armies. Conflicts like the Mexican-American War, the Civil War, and World War I were waged by a mixture of volunteers, conscripts, and/or state militia units. The U.S. Army was, outside of declared wars, a largely vestigial force compared to those maintained by European powers. Armies are expensive things to maintain, and in an age of muskets and artillery, they became more costly than ever.The Constitution’s drafters also operated from a few basic geopolitical assumptions. In 1789, the United States consisted of 13 newly united colonies along the Eastern Seaboard. About 2.5 million Americans lived within its borders, of whom one-fifth were enslaved. A large standing army was not needed to maintain peace with the surrounding powers or to engage with Native American tribes. Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalist, Number 8, noted that continental European nations have unbroken land borders that require fortification and military rule to maintain.The United States, on the other hand, had no meaningful rivals around it. “If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation,” he advised. “Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security.”The Continental Army had disbanded after the Revolution, and the United States Army that had replaced it was a token force at best. The Congress of the Confederation created the First American Regiment in 1784 with the anticipation that it would include about 700 men; it struggled to reach that size by the time the Constitution was adopted in 1789. The Framers anticipated that the bulk of American military strength would consist of the 13 states’ militias, both for practical reasons and for ideological ones.To that end, they sought to entrench the state militias’ status in the Constitution after its ratification through the Second Amendment. “What, sir, is the use of a militia?” Representative Elbridge Gerry said, during a House debate about the Second Amendment in 1789. “It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty.… Whenever Governments mean to invade the rights and liberties of the people, they always attempt to destroy the militia, in order to raise an army upon their ruins. This was actually done by Great Britain at the commencement of the late revolution.”Fears of standing armies—and the deleterious effects that they would bring to republican society—were common in the founding era. In the Declaration of Independence, the Americans accused George III of “quartering large bodies of armed troops among us,” as well as “[keeping] among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures,” and “affect[ing] to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.”One of the Founders’ principal concerns before the Revolution was Britain’s stationing of large numbers of soldiers on colonial shores. “As to the Standing Army kept up among us in time of Peace, without the Consent of our Assemblies, I am clearly of Opinion that it is not agreeable to the [British] Constitution,” Franklin wrote to an associate in 1770. Had George III raised an army from “Ireland and the Colonies” and brought it to England without Parliament’s assent, he added, “I am persuaded he would soon be told that he had no Right so to do, and the Nation would ring with clamours against it.”Recent experience of British military occupations in Boston, New York, and other places had hardened early Americans’ views. The Boston massacre, where British troops opened fire on a crowd of colonial citizens, had been central to early narratives of independence. So too lingered cultural memories of the English Civil War, which began in part after Charles I tried to use the army to intimidate and suppress Parliament, and Oliver Cromwell’s Protectorate that followed it, which had ruled the British Isles as a military dictatorship.The English experience was hardly ancient history to the founding generation; it was roughly as distant to them as World War I is now to us. As the Framers set out to craft a wholly republican constitution for the new nation, they were particularly sensitive to military rule in ancient republics like Greece and Rome. But as the revolutionary cause had been launched in part to preserve what the Founders saw as inherent liberties and freedoms derived from long English tradition, fear of military rule became paramount.George Washington’s farewell address, for example, is well remembered for its advice to avoid foreign entanglements and preserve the Union. If the states turned against one another, he warned, they would be forced to maintain armies against one another and become pawns of foreign intrigues. Preserving the Union would, Washington explained, “avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty.”This association between standing armies and despotism also influenced the structure of the Constitution. Though the president is commander in chief of the armed forces, he is not their sole master. Congress alone can “raise and support armies,” and it can do so for no more than two years at a time before they must be reauthorized. It can “make rules for the government and regulation” of the military, and it is responsible for laying out the rules that govern when and how the militia can be used in federal service.Much of the focus of Congress’s war powers today is on the specific power to declare war itself. This is a vital and important check, but it is not the only one. Until the twentieth century, presidents needed Congress’s approval to wage war—both to declare it as a matter of legality and to fund it as a matter of practicality. A president could not truly wage war without Congress until the mid-twentieth century because they had no real forces at their command. Funding, not authorization, is the real source of Congress’s power over the military.“The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents,” Hamilton wrote in The Federalist, Number 26. “They are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence.”Though Hamilton does not say it outright, the two-year spending limit is a subtle but clever bit of constitutional design. Even if Congress decides to fund a war, it cannot do so beyond the next election in the House of Representatives, which also takes place every two years. This too has its roots in English history. As I’ve noted before, Congress’s general power of the purse grew out of the long history of taxation squabbles between the English monarchy, which often sought to wage war, and Parliament, representing the nobles and gentry who could obtain greater freedoms in exchange for funding it.In a post–World War II era, however, this framework has broken down. Warfare in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries bears little to no resemblance to warfare in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. No longer was combat waged simply by rifles and cannons, or by large groups of infantry and cavalry. Now it required an industrial base that could supply tanks, airplanes, and other heavy machinery. With greater scientific advancement came greater destructive power. A single U.S. aircraft carrier can overthrow a medium-size nation’s government.Americans have now grown used to standing armies in the post–World War II era, when they could be justified by the Cold War and its associated conflicts. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union did not return things to normal; U.S. leaders soon claimed that their post-1991 supremacy justified a greater American presence on the world stage. After the September 11 attacks, politicians from both parties treated global military power—and the immense resources necessary to support it—as a necessity.I do not mean to offer a comprehensive overview of modern American military history and foreign policy. Nor do I mean to suggest that some U.S. deployments overseas are unnecessary or undesirable, or that the U.S. should abandon its commitments to NATO allies or its Asian-Pacific partners. All I wish to note is that it is now unthinkable for most Americans and nearly all of our federal elected officials to have anything other than millions of men and women in permanent military service, a dozen aircraft carriers, a massive air force, and hundreds of bases around the world.The United States, through its elected representatives, made a conscious choice after 1945 to not demilitarize itself as it had after previous conflicts. It made a conscious choice after the Vietnam era to abandon the draft in future conflicts and opt for an all-volunteer force, further separating civilian and military societies from each other. And it has made conscious choices after the Gulf War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War to keep ramping up military spending in the absence of a major adversary. Americans, via Congress, have decided—perhaps without actively realizing it—to create and maintain the standing army that their ancestors had long feared.When Trump took power again last year, nobody seriously argued against changing course. The president requested more than $850 billion for the military, and Congress responded by handing him $8 billion more than he had requested. It was not a matter of party control, either: Both the House and the Senate approved military funding by wide bipartisan margins. In doing so, they handed him a broad mandate to wage limited wars like the one he launched against Venezuela last year and Iran this year. (Do not bother pondering the never-used War Powers Act, which is basically a fig leaf for Congress’s abdication at this point.)None of this changes the fact that Trump is still constitutionally required to seek Congress’s approval, or that the war he launched is illegal and therefore an impeachable offense. But Congress itself shares a measure of the blame. Nothing that Trump did was possible without its support and funding, as well as the choices that past generations of American leaders have made. If Congress wants to truly reassert itself, it could follow in its ancestral footsteps by turning down Trump’s request for even more funding to keep waging the war. In the modern age, that is the truest test of congressional approval.

Trump Press Sec Tirade Takes Truly Weird Turn as GOP Iran Angst Spikes
New Republic 6 days ago

Trump Press Sec Tirade Takes Truly Weird Turn as GOP Iran Angst Spikes

This week, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt lashed out at a reporter and accused the media of trying to make Donald Trump “look bad.” The occasion was a question about Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who had previously accused the media of the same. What’s truly strange is how Leavitt flatly denied Hegseth had said what everyone heard him say, followed by an unhinged, extended tirade at reporters. Why the rage? Well, Republicans are growing anxious: Punchbowl News reports that they expressly don’t want to vote on the war to keep their distance from it, and many of them are straining to avoid even using the word “war.” We talked to New Republic deputy editor Tori Otten, who co-wrote a good piece with TNR’s Grace Segers dissecting White House social media strategy. We discuss the real sources of Leavitt’s anger, the importance of fantasy and unreality to MAGA politics, and why it’s all actually working against Republicans. Listen to this episode here. A transcript is here.